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ABSTRACT
The underlying values inherent in the creation of bitcoins are those of
decentralization and accessibility. The horizontal power structure is an
integral part of bitcoins’ architecture – this paper seeks to find a feasible
alternative to status quo in order to preserve these characteristics. First,
we look at the harms of monopolies and how the concentration of bitcoins
is exceptionally harmful to its continued existence. Second, we expose
the inadequacies of the existing regulatory frameworks, and discuss how
status quo militates against the foundational ideology of bitcoin as a
non-institutional cryptocurrency. Third, we undertake a comparative
study of the existing regulatory regimes to identify legal and regulatory
issues surrounding bitcoins. Finally, we propose a solution to the concern
of centralization by discussing the relationship between law, code and
the market, and discussing existing coded solutions that may be further
improved upon to prevent such monopoly.
Before the advent of pervasive state regulation, the intrinsic value of currencies
was driven by scarcity. Money was thus made of animal bones, skins or precious
metals.1 In the contemporary era, its value is derived from the government and its
narrative of stability, rule of law and legitimacy. The shortcomings of this trustbased model was the rationale for Satoshi Nakamoto’scryptocurrency, allowing
reversible transactions across a communications channel sans a trusted third party
*
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institution.2 Not only did he find the current model cost and time inefficient, but
also entailed vesting government regulators with excessive powers – that in the
recent past, have been deeply politicized. Bitcoins, instead, would be based on
cryptographic proof.3 Double spending would be prevented by a public block
chain, i.e., the transactional history of the currency that was earlier entrusted
solely with the government mint.4 Decentralization, a fiercely horizontal power
structure and a robust code, is what drives the world’s first currency entirely
outside state control.
The architecture of the bitcoin system merits regulation because, as we argue, it is
especially susceptible to monopolization, particularly by mining pools. Some argue
that the public block chain and constant vigilance maintained by the bitcoin
community represent an improvement from the “trust-based model” of reliance
on banks and financial intermediaries – trusted third parties.5 The argument goes
that the reduced costs and privacy of the architecture of bitcoin offers outweighs
the purported benefits of state regulation.6 Mining pools are entities that are made
up of shared resources of different users who then equally split the reward from
such mining based on the amount of work they have put in.7 Recent instances of
GHash, a mining pool, hovering around the 45% range witnessed sharp criticism
for coming close to the 50% threshold. The counter-argument runs that once any
single entity exercises control over more than 50%, it has the power to legitimize
suspect, and has irreversible,8 transactions powers that subvert bitcoin’s
decentralized functioning.9 The fear of centralization triggered a concomitant fall
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in the value of bitcoin and selling by some of the currency’s developers, like Peter
Todd.10 This fear of a single mining pool reaching 51% is well-founded. A group
of determined miners can block the entire system with their numbers, apart from
engaging in double spending, manipulation of the block chain and devaluation,
all of which would be legitimized by the networks controlled by this mining
pool. The strength of bitcoin lies in its distributed network – but with the
unanticipated prominence of mining pools, networks are steadily coming under
the control of single entities.11 Therefore, while 51% is a grave threshold, the
aggregation of these networks represents the more egregious, existential threat to
the bitcoin community.
Nonetheless, mining pools are greatly advantageous. They enhance computing
power; consequently the ability to mine more bitcoins. This incentivizes more
miners to join since greater profits are shared equally within the group.
Concomitantly, the group gains control of more networks.12 Now, mainstream
fiat currencies rely on a central authority to prevent fraudulent transactions. The
bitcoin community depends on itself, premised on the independence and vigilance
of miners. Therefore, the public updated block chain identifies fraud, such as the
use of spent bitcoins (double spending) or fake bitcoins. However, it ignores the
possibility of mining pools working in sync. Therefore, today an overwhelming
majority of bitcoins are not controlled by independent miners but by pools.13
This steady centralization is ironic, since the idea behind cryptocurrencies was to
escape from it. Further, it also has pernicious consequences for the relationship of
trust that it shares both within the community and with the economy. The future
of bitcoins, its valuation and use all depend on the level of trust. Governments
enjoy a presumption of trust but bitcoins’ trust is grounded in the miners, and
10
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the robustness of the transactions. For a nascent currency, even a prospect of
compromise would have irreversible harms.
In this essay, we argue that the reality is an approximation of the two and perhaps,
even more extreme. The 51% threshold is dispositive, but often functions as a
smokescreen for the more important debate – that of centralization. Concentration
of bitcoins and computing power in a limited number of entities, as shown above,
pivots the bitcoin system more towards the “trust-based model” that Nakamoto
eschewed. It is pertinent to note that GHash conducted an attempted double
spending transaction when it was well below 51%. Thus, how can the horizontal
power structure of bitcoinsbe protected along with its characteristic features?
Andreas Antonopoulos opines that the 51% attack hypothesis goes against the
fundamental incentives that bitcoin miners have and this makes the attack
unlikely.14 Others have called for reactionary, ad-hoc mechanisms such as breaking
up groups that reach 51%.15 The calls for regulation stem from the need to protect
the interests of bitcoin investors, the average consumer and the broader economy.16
At the outset, we argue that both the incentive-based model, premised on the
purported incentives of the bitcoin community, and ad-hoc hierarchical measures,
such as regulating bitcoin in current regulatory frameworks,17 are flawed and
inadequate. We further compare regulatory regimes across jurisdictions and
conclude that regulation targeting the architecture of bitcoin is most likely to be
effective in the long-run.18 For instance, a robust code-based solution strikes the
balance between the competing interests outlined so far.
The two broad responses to this problem as they stand, the incentive-based and
consequentialist models, merit attention. The incentive-based model relies on the
self-interest of the principal stakeholders of bitcoins in protecting the currency.
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For instance, GHash itself stopped new membership and witnessed an outflow of
members as it approached 50%. Its press release clarifies that it didn’t intend to
reach 51% “as it will do serious damage to the Bitcoin community, which we are
part of.”19 We argue that that this model is problematic at three levels. First, it
presumes that all stakeholders have a vested interest in the future of bitcoin. This
is not necessarily true. By eluding state regulation in toto, bitcoin represents the
biggest threat to state monopoly over economic life. Moreover, bitcoin openly
challenges state policies. When government pressure compelled Visa and PayPal
to block transactions involving Wikileaks, bitcoins were the alternative means of
payment. Therefore, the government, which is also a critical bitcoin stakeholder,
has an incentive to subvert it from within. Further, the farrago of thefts and
fraudulent transactions20 mean a presumption of good faith is at best, fanciful.
Second, it ignores the possibility of short-term gain. Phenomena like insider trading,
predatory pricing and artificial currency devaluation have destabilizing
consequences on the financial system but are still popular since they yield high
short-term gains for individual stakeholders. This behaviour would and has been
mirrored in crypto currencies.21 Third, a system that is contingent on the benevolence
of actors is inherently weak. Any system of accountability is not based on the
assumption that the actors are benign, but in the need to curtail the actions of
malevolent ones. For instance, even in terms of institutional governance,
constitutions are drafted on the basis of the principle of constitutionalism, which
stipulates that there be a charter of limitations to governmental power – although
the setting up of the government may be a bona fide act. Thus for bitcoin to
develop, GHash’s press release should be inconsequential to say the least.
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The consequentialist model calls for intervention after monopolistic actions have
taken place. For example, a group that reaches 51% will be compelled to break up
before further transactions are allowed. However, a consequentialist reaction is
often merely a stop-gap measure and is hardly an adequate response to a principled
issue with the system. Legal regulation is consequentialist, as the law comes into
force only after a situation demanding regulation arises. Even in the sense of
compliance based regulation, for such guidelines to be legislated upon, a situation
requiring such legislation may have arisen – or can be predicted to arise in the
near future. In that sense, we argue that post-facto fire-fighting is ineffective in
the long run, as there will constantly be ways in which code may be used to
subvert such regulation. Michael Lewis highlights Regulation NMS that, he argues,
not only failed to curb fraudulent trades but also strengthened the position of
market intermediaries allowing for unscrupulous high frequency trading. The
gap between technology and law would be further widened by rigid
consequentialist approaches.
In order to understand emerging trends in regulation of cryptocurrencies, and to
highlight the potential issues that may arise, we have undertaken a comparative
study of the status of bitcoins in countries that have provided regulatory responses
to it.22
The first pool of countries stands at the twilight of acceptance/regulation of bitcoin.
Israel recognized it as a ‘virtual currency’, apt for payments.23 The Belgian
government has legalized but not incorporated it as a valid currency.24 The Hong
Kong Monetary Authority decided against regulation of this ‘virtual commodity’.25
Further, Turkey,26 Columbia27 and Denmark prohibit financial institutions from
22
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trading in cryptocurrencies while individuals face no such restriction. This might
change as Denmark prepares standards that protect users from potential risks.28
Germany allows bitcoins to be used for trade and tax, although recognizing bitcoins
as “private money”.29
The second pool is of nations with a stringent tax liability mode of regulation.
Countries such as Australia intend to establish tax guidelines for bitcoin use.30
Brazil31 and Finland32 tax bitcointransactions as capital gains. Bulgaria, on the
other hand, treats bitcoins as financial instruments, thus taxing it at the same rate
as ordinary income.33 Norway treats bitcoins as an asset, attracting wealth and
sales tax.34 Canada has issued a statement that details the treatment of bitcoins in
the same manner as barter transactions, as well as the applicability of the existing
anti-money laundering legislation.35 The UK similarly levies VAT if bitcoins are
26
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bought and sold, as well as capital gains tax on profits.36 The USA’s fragmented
approach, where the IRS treats bitcoins as property and subject to capital gains
tax, whilst the Treasury treats it as a currency, renders bitcoins subject to antimoney laundering and anti-terrorist financing legislation.37
The third pool is characterized by overcautious regulation, bordering on
antagonism. China and Japan, have banned financial institutions from trading in
bitcoins within the country while individuals remain exempt from it.38 Taiwan
has warned against the use of bitcoins, and prevented a bitcoin ATM from being
built.39 Russia pejoratively terms bitcoins “money substitutes” in a classic
institutional response to bitcoin that considers the system to be a segue into criminal
networks.40 The Reserve Bank of India stated it has no plans to regulate while
retaining the extensive right to do so.41 In a 2014 statement, the Indonesian
government declared that bitcoins stand in contravention of extant legislation.42
Along similar lines, Iceland prohibits foreign exchange trading in crypto currencies;
however Iceland has itself adopted Auroracoins, an ‘authorized’ crypto currency.43
A comparative jurisdictional approach yields the following issues that plague
attempts at state regulation. First, the defining characteristic of bitcoin is that it is
37
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a decentralized, accessible currency. The nature of municipal law necessitates an
institutional approach to regulation that entails a hierarchical power structure.
Such an institution would have the power to restrict circulation or ban bitcoins
altogether, thus diminishing its accessibility. Second, the regulatory regimes’
treatment of bitcoins as a commodity, rather than a currency, betrays a reluctance
to engage with decentralized currencies. Third, there is a vast information gap on
the purposes for which bitcoins are used, which lends itself to suspicion and
overcautious regulation. Finally, the clearest issue that emerges is that of
incompatibility – that each country has different views on what sort of measures
to impose on bitcoins and what sorts of laws they might be subject to, thereby
creating no space for compossibility.
Thus there is a dissonance between law’s concreteness and certainty, and
technology’s constant state of innovation. This throws up new challenges for
legal regulation that may not be solved simply through the proliferation of new
legislations or through the expansion of those in existence. Lawrence Lessig’s ‘Code’
provides a compelling framework in which this constructive may be based.44 He
lays out four factors, which presently determine to what extent and how cyberspace
is regulated: the law; the norms of the society; the market; and the architecture of
cyberspace. Lessig argues that in cyberspace, it is not only regulation by law, but
the very design of the technology that is the framework for regulation the limiting
or regulatory framework. Lessig terms this as the ‘architecture of control’ of the
digital world. He argues that the law exists to regulate the market, and although
it has an impact upon technology, code forms the architecture of the system and
may subvert the regulatory framework that the law has imposed upon it. For
cyberspace to continue existing as it is, it must embody certain values that netizens
hold dear – such as free speech, individual control and anonymity.45 Since
cyberspace is created by servers in different geographical locations, its regulation
is complex and cannot be done by one country alone.46 Further the application of
national laws to different servers, based on their territorial location leads to further
complications with regard to say, liability for harmful content, accessed from
44
45
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another territorial location. By virtue of being deeply entrenched in state
institutions, law is principally based on different grounds as opposed to the digital
space.47 Lessig acknowledges this and states that the uniqueness of the interaction
that we have through cyberspace, is difficult for the law to adequately regulate.
Therefore, in light of Lessig’s framework, we propose a two-pronged, principlebased solution that will speak to the idea that the law can exist as a mere tool to
correct states of imbalance, as they exist, between the market and code.
The most prevalent issues, as outlined above, are those of centralization and
monopolization. Although mining pools provide certain advantages, the threat
of monopoly looms large, and questions the survival of the bitcoin project in the
first place.48 Thus, the first prong of the solution that we propose is that the code
itself be altered in order to prevent monopoly creation. For instance, monopolistic
behavior such as tending towards 51% would result in being locked out of the
bitcoin system altogether. The sanction can operate on a sliding scale depending
on the egregiousness of the transgression. Rather than proposing a situation where
there exists no system of regulation at all (deregulation), we propose that the
primary task of regulation of a complex piece of technology must lie with the
creators and coders of the same, so as for them to preserve the values that Nakamoto
envisioned.49
The second prong is a move towards a threshold that may be introduced within
the code, in order to automatically break mining pools the moment they reach a
particular limit. This model would only require the code to break mining pools
once they reach a particular limit. We are proposing this on a principled level,
and are aware that any sort of threshold set would be arbitrary in nature. However,
we argue that this is necessary as it would tackle the actual problem of concentration
in mining of bitcoins, by keeping it significantly below the level of survival required
for bitcoins to continue to remain within circulation, as a cryptocurrency. There
exist coded solutions in this form, such as the P2Pool.50 P2Pool miners create
47
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their own blocks, however share the rewards amongst the entire pool. An internal
coded mechanism has been created – each share is assembled into a share chain, in
order to maintain fairness and prevent fraud. Thus those miners who do not
follow these rules get excluded from the main chain, thereby ensuring that such
rules of fairness are followed.51 This solves the issue of decentralization, as no
single person is in charge of the distribution of rewards, as well as retains the
autonomy of individual miners who can choose which transactions they want to
enter into. Further there exists no reliance upon pool operators and such entities,
for payment to miners, as miners get paid directly.52
The two principal ideas in this essay are the harms of centralization in bitcoin
coupled with the inevitable institutionalization that accompanies state regulation.
We clearly demonstrate that any form of traditional regulation that entails a
vertical power structure militates against the very idea of bitcoin itself. Is it possible
to protect bitcoin from monopolistic practices while retaining its horizontal,
decentralized structure? The balance that is to be struck is that of code, law and
the marketplace. Lessig provides the ideal framework to understand how this
balance would play out. It speaks to both the futility of centralized regulation in
the digital space as well as the dire need to protect its most cherished values. We
also add nuance to this balance by proposing two possible solutions, each functioning
in a different paradigm. Therefore, we show that it is not only viable but also
vital for bitcoin to find this balance, before, to borrow from Douglas Adams, it
becomes necessary to wave the towel “in emergencies as a distress signal, and of
course dry yourself off with it if it still seems to be clean enough.”
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